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Deep history: a rejoinder
David laibman
While i ordinarily would not seek to comment on a review article, i find that altug 
Yalcintas’ essay on my book, Deep history (JPe, V:1, 2011, 168-182) so thoroughly 
distorts and conceals the actual contents of the book that some sort of rejoinder 
seems in order. in what follows, i will pass quickly from characterization of the 
review to a new formulation of the book’s main theme, in the hope that some readers 
may be moved to examine the argument in full detail [1].
Yalcintas begins by attributing to me a project which i never had in mind: some 
sort of “combination” of a marx-based historical materialism with what he calls 
“evolutionary” social theory. The latter is never clearly defined, but it seems to 
encompass the critical realism of present-day writers roy Bhaskar and Tony 
lawson, along with the work of Thorstein Veblen and Joseph schumpeter. having 
been told my goal was to “bridge” these two worlds, i am criticized for not having 
addressed the work of Bhaskar and lawson; clearly it would be strange for an 
author to seek a synthesis between two poles without citing one of these at all. my 
intention, however, as clearly stated in the book, was (and is) quite different: to 
outline a historical materialism that makes use of the full insights of a general-
directed theory of history [2], while not only not short-changing the immense 
variety and contingency of the historical record, but actually enhancing our capacity 
to embrace that record. in developing my own project, i presented and addressed the 
work of numerous contemporary scholars (Dimitris milonakis, alan carling, Paul 
nolan, and Jared Diamond, among others) as well as classic works in the marxist 
tradition. i did not, in this one book, examine the work of Bhaskar and lawson; as 
indeed i did not discuss althusser, Balibar, foucault, laclau and mouffe, mandel, 
Wallerstein, frank, cardoso, and countless others. The book is an argument, not 
a compendium. The first of Yalcintas’ “two main shortcomings” of Deep history, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 3
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the “audience problem,” apparently refers to my failure to refer specifically to the 
unlikely quartet of Bhaskar-lawson-Veblen-schumpeter. But since Yalcintas never 
explains clearly what the work of this quartet entails, and why it is relevant to my 
argument, the criticism seems misplaced.
The second shortcoming,“the evolutionary problem,” emerges amidst a welter of 
quotations from various sections of my book, taken out of context, and criticized 
in such a cryptic manner that it is hard to discern a systematic case being made. 
essentially, however, Yalcintas sees me as putting forward some sort of teleology, 
the “received view of human history,” according to which all societies pass through 
a rigid and predetermined succession of stages, toward some final preconceived 
endpoint. he then quotes me as saying more or less the opposite, preceded by the 
words: “laibman admits that. . .” This is a bit like the following: a) “laibman’s 
theory is that the moon is made of green cheese.” b) “laibman says: ‘the moon is not 
made of green cheese; it consists of oxygen, silicon, magnesium, iron, and other trace 
elements.’” c) “laibman thus admits that his theory (a) is false.” something like this 
occurs throughout Yalcintas’ review.
“evolutionary thinking,” which Yalcintas supports, is apparently equivalent to 
insistence upon variety of possible paths of development, diversity of circumstances, 
etc. By contrast, my “account of historical materialism is not free from the strict 
directionality which has no or limited place in evolutionary thinking.” “an 
emphasis of necessity over contingency and of commonality over specificity is 
not what the reader expects in the work of an author whose aim is to ‘soften’ the 
quasi-marxist rhetoric of directionality.” i have no idea who this “reader” is or 
what he/she expects; nor do i know where in my book the word “soften” appears, 
but what i am able to derive from this discussion is that the issues regarding the 
relation between directionality and common characteristics in social evolution, vs. 
contingency and uniqueness of individual circumstances, looms large in Yalcintas’ 
version of evolutionary thinking; that he has not been able to sort all this out and 
therefore assumes that i have not been able to do so either.[3]
rather than continue with the tedious task of trying to address Yalcintas’ rather 
confusing characterizations and claims, let me now attempt a restatement of the core 
argument of Deep history, Part i, on the general issues in historical materialist 
theory. (Parts ii and iii of the book, on capitalism and socialism, respectively, i 
will leave to the interested reader.)The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 4
laibman, David (2012) ‘Deep history: a rejoinder’,  
The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
Deep history: a brief reconstruction
marxist historical thinking emerged when socialists began to think about 
socialism not as merely a morally superior possible future, but as a stage in human 
development, one that rests upon earlier stages. This idea of structured (“stadial”) 
social evolution necessarily appeared in “hard” and “soft” forms.
The “hard” theory presumed (at least implicitly) that all societies actually pass 
through the perceived stages; that the stages are empirically common to all, or at 
least most, human experience. against this, a veritable mountain of anthropological 
and historical research has recorded the existence of huge variety in the historical 
record, including vast regions (viz., the multi-millennial asiatic, or hydraulic, 
societies) in which progression through identifiable stages does not seem to exist at 
all, to instances of skipping or bypassing of stages, blockages of transitions between 
stages, appearance of certain features associated with a given stage (e.g., slavery) in 
both ancient and again in modern times, and, in general, such enormous differences 
in detail among societies that are presumably representative of a given stage of 
development as to render the stage characterization suspect. Thus, a “soft” historical 
materialism emerges. Dropping the classical commitment to a general and directed 
theory of social evolution, the soft position argues for a more nuanced commitment 
to partial explanations: history is seen to progress (if at all) through a variety of 
pathways; certain precursor and successor relations can be found only in particular 
social formations (what might be called “micro-stadiality”); and in general 
theoretical claims are mitigated in order to conform to the richness and complexity 
of the visible record.
now, the core proposal of Deep history is that the very dichotomy, between “hard” 
and “soft,” is unnecessary and misconceived. While my reviewer repeatedly asserts 
that i defend the “hard” position, i actually argue something quite different: the 
vast materials of history give rise to a distillation, which i call the abstract social 
Totality (asT). The asT is not a collection of observable traits common to all 
societies; rather, it is a set of essential relations that grasp certain fundamental 
principles governing social existence [4]. an incomplete list of these might include: 
the necessary and ever-present metabolism with nature, i.e., labor; the necessarily 
social dimension of this metabolism, marx’s “relations of production”; the immanent 
tendency of the human-nature relation (the “forces of production”) to develop 
in the direction of ever-greater human knowledge and power over the external 
environment; the immanently conservative thrust of the relations of production that The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 5
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periodically bring them into conflict with the corresponding forces; and periodic 
ordered transition from given systems of production to more advanced systems, “in 
an order revealing progressively more sophisticated and powerful means of coercion, 
incentive and control” (Deep history, p. 28; quoted passage cited by Yalcintas).
The asT thus reveals a “determinate ladder of stages” (Deep history, p. 5). This 
determinate, directed process, however – and this is the crucial point that Yalcintas 
and many other commentators have missed – “occurs only at the level of the asT” 
(ibid., all italics in original). so, far from the theory being challenged by the 
existence of even a single empirical instance in which the given property does not 
appear, the theory does not require the appearance of the property in question in 
any actual part of the observable record! complications are introduced by variation 
in geography, climate, flora and fauna; differential rates of migration; diffusion of 
traits among social formations at different levels of development through contact, 
trade and conquest; and accidents of history and individual personality. When 
societies that are at different internal stages of development come into contact, the 
result is social formations containing elements from several distinct asT stages, 
or “modes of production,” all combined into a complex and often contradictory 
“social formation.” We may imagine a world in which these complications are so 
intense that we find no empirical instances of societies visually embodying the core 
characteristics of the stages adduced at the level of the asT. in the world we know, 
we do in fact find such instances: rome, in the last three centuries Bce and the 
first four centuries ce, rather clearly reveals central properties of the slave mode 
of production; Britain, in the 19th century ce, serves as a case study of capitalist 
industrialization, with minimal complication from pre-capitalist currents and 
external factors. most of the time, however, the asT does not appear directly in the 
historical record; nor should it.
What it does do is provide a searchlight to find and understand key pressure points, 
moments whose significance would otherwise be lost in the welter of conflicting 
historical evidence. The central element is the existence of consistent systems of 
organization of labor – the interdefined human-nature and human-human relations 
that we call a mode of production – and the pressure for transformation of those 
systems under the impact of technological progress, when that progress actually 
occurs. systematic exploration of the asT, the core project of historical materialist 
theory (in the version which i am proposing), brings to the surface a series of key 
necessities: links in the chain of human progress that must be traversed. The links 
in turn concern the relation between successive methods of surplus extraction in The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 6
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class-antagonistic societies, and corresponding systems of control; these systems 
have decisive effects on actual or potential productive development. i must leave 
presentation of the complete logic of these relations (at least insofar as i have been 
able to grasp them!) to Deep history itself.
once the relation between the asT and the vast and contingent raw material 
of history is understood, however, the matter of teleology, “inevitability,” and 
“evolution of societies to a predefined endpoint” (Yalcintas; the term “predefined 
endpoint” is a characteristic and unfortunate imposition, for which no source, 
least of all laibman, could be cited) becomes clear. Put simply: there is absolutely 
no sense in which historical materialist theory “predicts” any human outcome! if 
development of the productive forces undermines an existing social formation, 
there is still no reason why that development must occur; really existing ruling 
classes in particular times and places decide what forms of development are in their 
interests, and those interests may or may not include the dynamic process whose 
potential points toward social transformation. if those in control of production 
in a particular social formation block and prevent technical change, stasis will 
result. in some other combination of conditions on the ground, including accidental 
factors such as the vision and perspicacity of a single individual (viz., Peter the 
Great in 17th-18th century russia), a breakthrough will occur. The asT model does 
not determine the timing, manner, or even the ultimate coming-into-existence of 
theoretically identified transformations. Determinacy at the level of theory, then, 
does not contradict the all-important role of human agency in the actual historical 
process: nothing “happens” in history without the consciousness, will and actions 
of real human individuals. and progress through the sequence of antagonistic 
social forms toward socialist or communist forms is not inevitable, “pre-ordained,” 
or guaranteed. for that matter, human survival as such is not guaranteed; we 
must summon the will to avoid nuclear or ecological extinction, or indeed stasis at 
some low level dictated by the effects of destructive actions of humankind under 
the thrall of unprincipled and thoughtless social systems – and the outcome is 
uncertain.
it should be clear that my affirmations of contingency and variety at the level of 
concrete history are not apologies, retreats, afterthoughts, or “admissions.” They are 
based on, and take real meaning from, the asT, where an underlying determinacy 
and directionality is established.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 7
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methodological issues
now, any number of rather pointed questions, of an epistemological nature, jump 
to the fore. These are all discussed in Deep history, in passages cited by Yalcintas 
as “admitting” the “shortcomings” of my work. These questions, however, are 
central to any theoretical project that tries to move beyond the most simple-minded 
empiricism.
most important, perhaps, is the issue of verification. since the concepts of the 
asT (modes of production, productive forces, production relations, classes, stages) 
are not, as explained above, present directly in observable history, what validity 
criteria can be applied? is the asT model subject to tests for falsifiability? a simple 
(perhaps too simple) analogy may be applied: does the theoretical limiting concept 
of a perfect vacuum in physics have validity as a component of our understanding of 
physical reality, if, by definition, a perfect vacuum cannot ever actually be observed, 
in (what we choose to call) the “real world”?
a related issue is that of “essentialism.” in a nutshell: am i trying to have my cake 
and eat it too? is my distinction between two levels of abstraction like keeping a 
double set of books? The critique would run as follows: When i want to face up to 
the rigorous demands of the historical and anthropological literature, i embrace the 
contingency and variety of concrete social formations, and the openness of outcomes 
connected with them. When i wish to assert fundamental marxist understandings, 
such as the essential directedness of humanity’s long march through successive 
class-divided social formations toward socialism or communism, i then invoke the 
comforting verities of the asT.
These are serious questions, and i regard the inquiry surrounding them as 
open; in this brief communication i cannot hope to address them in any sort of 
comprehensive fashion. i can, and therefore will, set out a few guidelines.
first, i believe that we should acknowledge that the criteria by means of which the 
“truth” of the core propositions of historical materialist theory may be confirmed 
(or disconfirmed) must necessarily be complex; indeed, of an order of complexity 
whose very existence is summarily denied by classical positivist methodology. The 
claim, for example, that a theoretical ordering of stages in the existence of class-
antagonistic modes of production is determined by increasing sophistication of 
systems of incentive/coercion/control, made necessary by development of productive 
forces toward ever-higher levels of productivity, is clearly not a simple empirical The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 8
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matter, like that of establishing whether or not British financial interests actively 
supported the confederacy in the u. s. civil War, or whether or not private 
smallholding cultivation was a significant element in the economies of ancient 
mediterranean civilizations. (These latter questions, in turn, are empirical in a 
much more complex sense than simple “matters of fact,” such as the names of the 
Kings of england or the population of china in the 14th century.)
The validity of (what i will call) the asT claims must ultimately be established 
on the basis of their fruitfulness in application to historical research. The precise 
elements of the model will themselves evolve, as the process of distillation from the 
historical record, and from continuing social and political experience, continues. 
This distillation, clearly, is never complete. Then the question becomes: does 
the evolving asT model helps us actually to grasp the complexity, variety, irony 
and contingency of experience in ways that are not open to naive empiricism? 
This would clinch the matter: the very intricacy of the immediate can only be 
comprehended when it is reconstructed on the basis of theory. needless to say, 
arguments of this sort will not convince those who are strongly attached to 
empiricist or positivist modes of thought.
The full model – not developed here, for reasons of space – points to strategic 
functions of specific modes of production. These functions generally secure certain 
vital transitions: e.g., to stable reproduction of surplus extraction and formation 
of a leisured social upper class as the foundation for later productive development; 
or to intensive development of productive forces as the required foundation for 
generalization of commodity production and markets. The question then might be: 
could these vital transitions have taken place in the absence of the specific modes 
of production (e.g., slave, feudal) that hosted them in the world historical theaters 
where they are actually observed (viz., the mediterranean ancient world; northern 
and Western europe in the “middle ages”). The problem is that the later spread of 
capitalism around the world and its role in “overdetermining” the development paths 
of asian, african and latin american societies destroys the social laboratory in 
which this sort of question might eventually have received an empirical answer. But 
even the counterfactuals are interesting. if the foundations for spontaneous internal 
market development, for example, could have been laid in some social context other 
than that of the manorial systems of european feudalism, we are prompted to 
look for the precise features of, e.g., chinese and indian societies prior to the 19th 
century ce that might have performed in this role. in this way, again, we are able The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 9
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to grasp the specificities of non-european experiences to a greater degree than would 
be allowed by a simplistic, unstructured “empirical” account.
i hope these brief comments at least give an indication of how the asT model might 
both guide and be guided by detailed historical investigation. could any results 
of this investigation lead me to the conclusion that the entire approach should be 
rejected; that we must go back to the drawing boards? Perhaps, as regards particular 
claims for the importance of certain stadial orderings. But the most basic of the 
asT claims – the list of essential relations, enumerated above – approach the status 
of synthetic apriori propositions: truths that are not merely logical inferences from 
definitions, but that also are not falsifiable in a sense that applies to empirical 
statements of fact.
Perhaps the final answer to the “have cake/eat it too” charge is to reiterate the 
point about the indeterminacy of the actual path forward. a conceptually rigorous 
historical materialism can bolster confidence in our understanding of the general 
direction – toward transcending class division, toward overcoming the subsumption 
of labor and of working people under the heel of capital and surplus extraction, 
toward democratic planning and principled social processes – that must be followed 
if change is to be accomplished in ways that support and release the fullest human 
potentials. But even if true, this understanding does not entail that the transition 
will actually be accomplished. it can only help inform the political will to achieve 
it, thereby contributing to the conscious process whereby the transition can acquire 
political reality, in time to avert several interconnected looming disasters that 
if unchecked could derail human progress for the foreseeable future, or even 
absolutely.
What, then, remains of the “evolutionary” critique?
my critic sees all this as “unbalanced research methodology”; attributes to me all 
manner of ideas that no one defends, least of all myself; and credits unnamed 
evolutionists for grasping a welter of truisms about the existence of alternative 
pathways in historical change, the centrality of agency in historical explanation, 
the importance of unintended consequences of intentional action, and so on, all of 
which i clearly share, as amply demonstrated by a careful reading of Deep history. 
one must wonder: what is actually going on here?The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 10
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i can only conclude that Yalcintas, like many other historians, is prisoner of an 
unexamined commitment, to a view of history that resists any concept of a deep 
structure underlying human affairs, because that structure is precisely where the 
solution to the conundrum of necessity and accident, directedness and variety, 
determinacy and consciousness, etc. is to be found. he finds solace in a pastiche of 
“evolutionary” theorists, in whose works it is indeed hard to find a common core; 
this amalgam reduces, in effect, to repeated assertions that anything can happen 
in history, against a fatuous strawperson, the presumed belief that “there is an 
established trajectory, in which change must follow.” Does all of this amount to a de 
facto rejection of the historical materialist proposition concerning the need for (not 
the “inevitability of”) socialist transformation? one can’t be sure.
in any case, Yalcintas believes that the important questions “remain to be 
answered.” i will let readers decide whether his “evolutionist lens” or my structured 
approach to social evolution, as presented in Deep history, is the more appropriate 
vehicle for study of these important questions.
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